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1 Introduction  
 
Despite the increased recognition of the beneficial role that fathers can play in the 
lives of their children by allowing not only married fathers, but also some unmarried 
fathers automatic parental responsibilities and rights, the new Children's Act1 has 
retained the status quo to the extent that it still does not confer automatic, inherent 
parental rights on biological fathers on the same basis as mothers.2 This contribution 
aims to ascertain whether the continued differential treatment, regarding the initial 
allocation of parental responsibilities and rights, can be justified in view of 
international trends emphasising the importance of the role of both parents in the 
upbringing of their children.3 These international trends have for the most part been 
inspired by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter 
referred to as the UNCRC) that has been ratified by all United Nations' member 
states, except the United States of America and Somalia.4 Article 9(3) of the UNCRC 
obliges state parties to respect the child's right to contact with both parents while 
Article 18(1) of the UNCRC compels state parties to apply their best efforts to ensure 
recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the 
upbringing of the child. 
 
                                        
*  Anne Louw. BA Bluris LLB LLD (Pretoria). Senior lecturer, Department of Private Law, University 
of Pretoria, South Africa (Anne.Louw@up.ac.za). 
1  38 of 2005. While most of the provisions dealing with the acquisition of parental responsibilities 
and rights have been in operation since 1 July 2007, the Children's Act only became fully 
operational on 1 April 2010. Any further reference to "the Children's Act" has this Act in mind. 
2  See S 20 and 21 of the Children's Act. The latter section, which is fundamental to the present 
discussion, is quoted in full in n 31. 
3  Sinclair "Legal personality" 27.  
4  States such as the Cook Islands, Niue and Switzerland have ratified the UNCRC despite not 
being United Nations' members. See in general Mahery "The United Nations Convention" 309 ff. 
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Not all countries have responded to the obligations and norms entrenched in the 
UNCRC with the same degree of enthusiasm and commitment.5 While Australia is 
probably now most in accordance with the approach underscored by the UNCRC,6 
other countries have, with varying degrees of success, justified a departure from 
such an approach.7  
 
South Africa ratified the UNCRC in 1995. Although the UNCRC is not generally 
regarded as a direct source of individual rights and obligations because its provisions 
are generally not formally incorporated into municipal law,8 it has been held9 to enjoy 
a heightened status in the South African legal framework for two important reasons: 
 
(a) Convention rights pertaining to children have been constitutionalised in Section 
28 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the 
Constitution), thereby giving the UNCRC legal significance in South Africa. 
 
(b) Specific provisions (such as Sections 39(1)(b) and 233) in the Constitution 
require courts to consider international law in their deliberations.10 
 
                                        
5  For a comparative overview in this regard, see Louw Acquisition of Parental Responsibilities 
134–148. 
6  The Australian Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) has since 1988 allowed for the initial allocation of 
parental responsibilities and rights to both mother and father on an equal basis, based on the 
ground of their parentage alone. The provisions created rights for parents regardless of their 
marital status. Wide-ranging changes to the regulation of the parent/child relationship were again 
brought about by the enactment of the Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth), which came into 
operation on 11 June 1996. The new provisions create a formal policy of joint parenting 
underpinned by the expressed principle that children have the right to know and be cared for by 
both their parents, irrespective of whether they are married, separated, have never married or 
never lived together, and the principle that children have a right of contact, on a regular basis, 
with both their parents. See Bailey-Harris 1996 Adel LR 84–85 and Mills Family Law 110–111. 
7  In Scotland, for example, the government rejected a recommendation by the Scottish Law 
Commission in their Report on Family Law to give automatic "parental responsibility" (the English 
equivalent of parental responsibilities and rights) to unmarried fathers. For a detailed discussion 
of the position of biological fathers in Scotland, see Lowe and Douglas Bromley's Family Law 
426–428. 
8  The Children's Act however expressly incorporated certain aspects of the UNCRC, such as the 
preamble, to name but one example. 
9  Sloth-Nielsen 2002 International Journal of Children's Rights 139. 
10  While other provisions of the Constitution, such as S 39(1)(a) and 39(2), do not specifically refer 
to international law, Sloth-Nielsen 2002 International Journal of Children's Rights 139 regards 
them as significant in so far as they were inspired by international norms. 
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In addition, the Children's Act now states as one of its objectives the realisation of 
the Republic's obligations concerning the well-being of children in terms of 
international instruments binding on the Republic.11 
 
It should be noted at the outset that while children have a right to parental care in 
terms of Section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution, the Constitution does not expressly 
protect the rights of parents qua parents in any direct manner.12 The paucity of 
constitutional protection afforded to the family, and more particularly, to the parents 
of the children within the family in the present context, stands in stark contrast to all 
major international human rights instruments that provide for the protection of the 
family and family relations in some way or another.13 The effect of this lacuna in our 
law has been the subject of much debate.14 Although the Constitution contains no 
express right to family life,15 the Constitutional Court in Dawood v Minister of Home 
Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs16 held 
that such right is indirectly protected via the right to dignity.17 Van der Linde18 
concludes that an express protection of the right to respect for family life, such as 
found in Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, also known as the European Convention on Human Rights 
                                        
11  S 2(c). The Children's Act in its preamble recognises the proclamation by the United Nations in 
the Declaration of Human Rights that children are entitled to special care and assistance and the 
need to extend particular care to children as stated in the "Geneva Declaration on the Rights of 
the Child, in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child, in the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and in the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and 
recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the statutes and relevant 
instruments of specialised agencies and international organisations concerned with the welfare of 
children". 
12  Bekink and Brand "Constitutional protection of children" 186. 
13  See Visser and Potgieter 1994 THRHR 495. 
14  See Van der Linde Grondwetlike Erkenning 15–21. 
15  The Constitutional Court justified the omission in Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional 
Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 1996 4 
SA 744 (CC) as discussed in Sloth-Nielsen and Van Heerden 2003 IJLPF 122. Had such a right 
been included in the Constitution, it would, according to Bonthuys 2002 SALJ 781, have avoided 
the contradictory judgments on the extent and ambit of the "family". 
16  2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 36. 
17  See also Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 605; Bekink and Brand "Constitutional 
protection of children" 186. Despite the absence of a provision directly protecting the right to 
family life, "the principles of dignity, equality and concern for the vulnerability of marginalised 
groups in society" have, according to Sloth-Nielsen and Van Heerden 2003 IJLPF 121 "heralded 
a wide-ranging revision of the legal meaning of family, of how the law should protect family 
members, and is reshaping the understanding of relationships between family members 
(including children)" (see abstract of article). 
18  Grondwetlike Erkenning 490. 
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(ECHR),19 would have avoided the convoluted manner of (indirect) protection 
currently necessitated by the absence of such a right and would have brought South 
Africa more in line with international trends in this regard.20 
 
Despite the fact that the parents of a child bear the primary burden to care for their 
child,21 the Constitution does not expressly entrench or protect the right of a parent 
to care and assume responsibility of his or her biological child.22 Since the 
Constitution, and more specifically, the Bill of Rights, "does not deny the existence of 
any other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, 
customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill",23 
parents would seem to retain their inherent common law right to assume 
responsibility of their children without arbitrary interference from the state.24 The 
court in Jooste v Botha25 was prepared to interpret Section 28(1)(b) in a manner 
consistent with the common law as being "aimed at the preservation of a healthy 
parent–child relationship in the family environment against unwarranted executive, 
administrative and legislative acts." 
 
The Constitution also does not explicitly protect the equal sharing of the rights and 
responsibilities of parents vis-à-vis their children,26 as found in many international 
                                        
19  On the ECHR in general, see Kilkelly The Child and European Convention 1. 
20  For similar views, see Visser 1996 De Jure 351, who questions the value of a right to family care 
where the family as a unit is not deemed worthy of protection and Robinson 1998 Obiter 329 
334–335. 
21  According to Moosa J in Centre for Child Law v Minister of Home Affairs 2005 6 SA 50 (T) para 
10: "The primary responsibility for the protection and promotion of the interests of the child vests 
in the parents". 
22  Cockrell "The Law of Persons and the Bill of Rights" with loose-leaf updates para 3E21. Cockrell 
contends in the same paragraph that such a right is also not recognised by implication in terms of 
S 28(2) of the Constitution and calls for a strict interpretation of the latter section "so as not to 
amount to a back-door recognition of the parental power".  
23  S 39(3) Constitution. 
24  Van Heerden "Judicial interference " 497 refers to this right as a "primordial" right that was 
reaffirmed in Petersen v Kruger 1975 4 SA 171 (C) para 173H. 
25  2000 2 BCLR 187 (T) para 195F–G – hereafter Jooste. 
26  The Constitution only protects the right to equality in general (S 9(1)) by prohibiting unfair 
discrimination on the grounds of, inter alia, sex, birth and marital status in S 9(3). There is some 
uncertainty as to whether S 28(1)(b) protects a child's right to bond with both its parents. While 
the section has been interpreted in Jooste as referring to care only by a custodian parent, 
Mosikatsana 1996 CILSA 163 and Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 607 maintain that 
it relates to care by both parents. Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook however at the 
same time admit (607) that "[m]ost legislation and judicial decisions do not protect the child's 
right to be cared for by both natural parents". 
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instruments.27 The absence of similar guarantees in the South African Constitution 
raises the question of whether biological parents have a constitutional right to 
assume parental responsibilities and rights on an equal basis.  
 
The concomitant duty of the child's constitutional right to parental care is imposed on 
parents, who in terms of the Children's Act automatically acquire parental 
responsibilities and rights,28 that is biological mothers in all cases (in terms of 
Section 19), married fathers (Section 20) and unmarried fathers who fall within the 
ambit of Section 21 of the Act.29 As far as maternal care is concerned, the right of the 
child to parental care thus corresponds fully with the duty imposed on the biological 
mother. As far as paternal care is concerned, the right of the child has been 
circumscribed by the provisions (Sections 20 and 21)30 of the Children's Act. The 
duty of care imposed upon fathers would thus appear to fall short of the 
Constitution's unconditional guarantee to children to provide them with parental care 
– hence the present enquiry into the constitutionality of the Children's Act in this 
regard. 
 
                                        
27  These instruments not only enshrine a right to parental care for all children, but also proceed 
from the fundamental premise of equality between the biological parents of the child as 
evidenced by A 9(3) and 18(1) of the UNCRC already mentioned. A 16(1)(d) of the United 
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women states 
unequivocally that men and women have the "same rights and responsibilities as parents". The 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child outlaws discrimination on grounds such as 
fortune, birth or other status of the child, the parent or the legal guardian, thereby ensuring 
protection of parental rights and responsibilities whatever their marital status. 
28  The concept of "parental responsibilities and rights" in lieu of "parental power" was introduced in 
the Children's Act (S 1(1)) to describe the rights, duties and responsibilities which a parent 
exercises in relation to his or her child. "Responsibilities" as used in the new concept has thus 
absorbed the idea of parental duties. 
29  In terms of S 28(1)(b), the child also has a right to family care and alternative care but the focus 
of the present article is limited to parental care. The possibility of persons other than the 
biological parents of a child acquiring parental responsibilities and rights (and therefore also a 
duty of care) in terms of S 23 and 24 of the Children's Act is for the same reason not addressed 
here. 
30  In terms of S 21(1) of the Children's Act, a biological father: "… who does not have parental 
responsibilities and rights in respect of the child in terms of section 20 [by being married to the 
mother], acquires full parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child – (a) if at the time 
of the child's birth he is living with the mother in a permanent life-partnership; or (b) regardless of 
whether he has lived or is living with the mother (i) consents to be identified or successfully 
applies in terms of section 26 to be identified as the child's father or pays damages in terms of 
customary law; (ii) contributes or has attempted in good faith to contribute to the child's 
upbringing for a reasonable period; and (iii) contributes or has attempted in good faith to 
contribute towards expenses in connection with the maintenance of the child for a reasonable 
period.  
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2 Constitutional enquiry 
 
2.1 Grounds for attack 
 
The differentiation between mothers and fathers as far as the acquisition of parental 
responsibilities and rights in terms of the Children's Act is concerned can conceivably 
be attacked on the following constitutional grounds: 
 
(a) It constitutes an infringement of the parents' right to equality in the following 
specific ways: 
(i) It unfairly discriminates against mothers on the grounds of sex, gender and 
marital status in terms of Section 9(3) of the Constitution. 
(ii) It unfairly discriminates against biological fathers in the following respects: 
 In relation to biological mothers, on the grounds of sex and gender in 
terms of Section 9(3) of the Constitution;31 and 
 in relation to mothers and married fathers or fathers who have 
committed themselves to the mother in a permanent life-partnership32 
on the ground of marital33 or equivalent status; 
 in relation to mothers and unmarried fathers who have shown the 
necessary commitment to their children as required by Section 
21(1)(b) of the Children's Act. 
 
(b) It constitutes an infringement on the following constitutional rights of children: 
(i) The right of a child not to be discriminated against on the grounds of social 
origin and birth (out of wedlock)34 in terms of Section 9(3) and the child's 
right to dignity in terms of Section 10; 
(ii) The constitutional rights of a child in terms of Section 28: 
 A child's right to parental care in terms of Section 28(1)(b); and  
                                        
31  In terms of S 9(3) of the Constitution: "The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly 
against anyone on one or more grounds, including ... gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
ethnic or social origin … and birth". 
32  As required by S 21(1)(a) of the Children's Act. 
33  As required by S 20 of the Children's Act. 
34  Cockrell "The Law of Persons and the Bill of Rights" para 3E24; Currie and De Waal Bill of 
Rights Handbook 256–257 and Albertyn and Goldblatt "Equality" 74. 
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 the right of the child to the paramountcy of its best interests as 
required by Section 28(2).  
 
While appreciating the fact that "constitutional rights are mutually interrelated and 
interdependent and form a single constitutional value system",35 the constitutional 
enquiry undertaken for present purposes will first look at the parents' position qua 
parents (as outlined in (a) above) and then proceed to consider the position of the 
children vis-à-vis their parents (as outlined in (b) above).  
 
2.2 Unfair discrimination against parents? 
 
2.2.1 General 
 
As far as the right to equality in general is concerned, it is important to keep in mind 
that Section 9 of the Constitution is not aimed merely at achieving formal equality.36 
The section as a whole must be read as grounded on a substantive conception of 
equality that takes actual social and economic disparities between groups and 
individuals into account.37 For this purpose, Section 9(2) of the Constitution allows 
for "remedial or restitutionary equality",38 that recognises measures "designed to 
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination".39 
 
According to Albertyn and Goldblatt,40 the test for unfair discrimination outlined in 
Harksen41 can be pared down to the following three queries: 
 
(a) Does the differentiation amount to discrimination? 
(b) If so, was it unfair?42 
                                        
35  As reiterated by Langa DCJ in De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local 
Division) 2004 1 SA 406 (CC) para 55. 
36  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 232: "Formal equality means sameness of 
treatment: the law must treat individuals in like circumstances alike". 
37  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 233–234. 
38  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) para 61. 
39  See also Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 324C–D (hereafter Harksen). 
40  "Equality" 43. 
41  Para 53. 
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(c) If so, can it be justified in terms of the limitations clause, that is Section 36 of the 
Constitution? To succeed with this inquiry, the criteria in terms of Section 36 
must be satisfied by showing that the right has been limited by a law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors, including: 
(i)  the nature of the right; 
(ii)  the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(iii) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(iv) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(v) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.43 
 
Goldstone J in Harksen44 describes this "final leg of the enquiry" as "a weighing of 
the purpose and effect of the provision in question and a determination as to the 
proportionality thereof in relation to the extent of its infringement of equality". 
According to Currie and De Waal,45 this does not really take the matter any further. 
These authors express doubt as to whether Section 36 has any meaningful 
application to Section 9 because "[t]he factors taken into account when determining 
whether the discrimination is unfair (the impact of the discriminatory measure) are 
very similar to the factors that are used to assess the proportionality of a limitation in 
terms of s 36".46 Despite the overlapping of the criteria, Currie and De Waal47 state 
                                                                                                                          
42  Discrimination based on a listed ground is presumed to be unfair: S 9(5) of the Constitution. As to 
discrimination on an unspecified ground, the unfairness will have to be proved: Albertyn and 
Goldblatt "Equality" 43. 
43  S 36(1) Constitution. 
44  Para 53. 
45  Bill of Rights Handbook 237. 
46  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 238. These authors find it, for instance: "... difficult to 
see how discrimination that has already been characterised as 'unfair', because it is based on 
attributes and characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of 
persons as human beings, can ever be acceptable in an open and democratic society based on 
dignity, freedom and equality. Similarly, it is difficult to see how one could justify as 'reasonable' a 
law which differentiates for reasons not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and 
which is therefore arbitrary. In a similar vein, Albertyn and Goldblatt "Equality" 81 state that the 
relationship between unfairness and justification "has been described as a 'paradox' since it 
seems impossible that something that violates the right to equality would be reasonable and 
justifiable in a society based on equality". Cf Kriegler J in his dissenting judgment in President of 
the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 77 (hereafter Hugo), suggesting that 
the factors of the respective enquiries should be distinguished from one another, holding that the 
enquiry in terms of S 36 is concerned with justification, possibly notwithstanding unfairness, while 
the S 9 enquiry is concerned with fairness and nothing else. 
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that the Constitutional Court has nevertheless, on each occasion when it has found a 
violation of the equality clause, also considered (however briefly) the effect of the 
limitation clause. 
 
2.2.2 Discrimination against mothers on grounds of sex, gender and marital 
status 
 
In terms of Section 19 of the Children's Act, "[t]he biological mother of a child, 
whether married or unmarried, has full parental responsibilities and rights in respect 
of the child". A biological father, on the other hand, must either be (or have been) 
married to the mother of the child in terms of Section 20 of the Children's Act or show 
the required commitment in terms of Section 21 – that is, either by living with the 
mother in a permanent life-partnership at birth or by identifying himself as the father, 
as well as contributing to the maintenance and upbringing of the child.48 Various 
reasons can be found for the law's preferential treatment of mothers as legal parents: 
 
(a) It promotes legal certainty. Since, unlike paternity, maternity49 could always be 
established with certainty, it made sense to allocate parental responsibilities and 
rights to the biological mother. In this way, the legal parentage of the child could, 
at least as far as the mother was concerned, be determined whatever the marital 
status of the child's parents. Paternity, as well as legal paternity, could then be 
determined with reference to a certain objectively determinable fact – maternity. 
 
(b) It gives effect to the importance of the mother's contribution to the child who, in 
the opinion of the Constitutional Court in Fraser v Children's Court, Pretoria 
North:50  
... has a biological relationship with the child whom she nurtures during 
the pregnancy and often breast-feeds after birth. She gives succour 
and support to the new life which is very direct and not comparable to 
that of a father. 
 
                                                                                                                          
47  Bill of Rights Handbook 238. 
48  See n 30 in which the section is quoted in full. 
49  The woman who gave birth to the child. 
50  1997 2 SA 261 (CC) para 274B – hereafter Fraser. 
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(c) Lastly, the automatic allocation of parental responsibilities and rights to the 
unmarried mother affords the mother, as primary caregiver, a certain degree of 
autonomy as far as decisions regarding her child are concerned. This protects 
her (and, as a consequence, presumably also the children born out of wedlock) 
from the unwarranted and sporadic interference by "irresponsible" fathers of 
such children.51 
 
It seems, therefore, that mothers are entrusted with full responsibilities and rights 
because they can give birth and, as mothers, are automatically presumed suitable to 
act in the best interests of the child.52 Fathers, on the other hand, are first subjected 
to a screening process. If they "pass" the screening test (by showing the necessary 
commitment to either the mother or the child)53 then, and only then, will the law 
accept and expect them to assume legal responsibilities and rights in respect of their 
child. Fathers who fail the "screening" test by not showing a sufficient degree of 
commitment are "spared" the burden of responsibilities automatically imposed on 
mothers. Since sex and gender are listed grounds of discrimination,54 the 
discrimination is presumed to be unfair unless it can be justified in terms of the 
limitation clause.55 
 
Despite the fact that the automatic allocation of parental responsibilities and rights to 
all mothers serves a rational purpose, the unfair impact of such an allocation may 
still result in unfair discrimination. According to Goldstone J in the Hugo case:56  
                                        
51  Kaganas "Joint custody and equality in South Africa" 181 contends that the mother is vulnerable 
to "disruptive interventions". 
52  Heaton "Family Law and the Bill of Rights" para 3C42.3. 
53  In terms of S 20 and 21 of the Children's Act. 
54  S 9(3) Constitution. 
55  S 36(1) Constitution. 
56  Para 38. The case concerned the constitutionality of a special remission of sentence granted by 
the President to certain categories of prisoners including "all mothers in prison on 10 May 1994, 
with minor children under the age of 12 years". The remission was embodied in a Presidential 
Act and was granted under S 82(1)(k) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 
of 1993 (the interim Constitution). The respondent, a father of a minor child under the age of 12 
years, sought an order declaring the Presidential Act unconstitutional in that it unfairly 
discriminated against him on the grounds of sex or gender and indirectly against his son because 
his incarcerated parent was not a female. The Durban and Coast Local Division upheld the 
contention and ordered the first appellant to correct the Presidential Act in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution within six months from the date of its order. The Constitutional 
Court on appeal, however, found that the remission did not constitute unfair discrimination in 
violation of S 8(2) of the interim Constitution. 
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For many South African women, the difficulties of being responsible for the 
social and economic burdens of child rearing, in circumstances where they 
have few skills and scant financial resources, are immense. The failure by 
fathers to shoulder their share of the financial and social burden of child 
rearing is a primary cause of this hardship.57 The result of being responsible 
for children makes it more difficult for women to compete in the labour 
market and is one of the causes of the deep inequalities experienced by 
women in employment. … It is unlikely that we will achieve a more 
egalitarian society until responsibilities for child rearing are more equally 
shared. 
 
Goldstone J in the Hugo case58 was not, as a rule, prepared to accept that it would 
be fair to discriminate between women and men on the basis that mothers bear an 
unequal share of the burden of child rearing in our society. However, the majority of 
the court ultimately found that the presidential pardon did not unfairly discriminate 
against fathers, since it could be seen as advancing the interests of a particularly 
vulnerable group (mothers) in society, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination in the 
past.59 
 
In a dissenting judgment, Kriegler J60 endorsed the general observations in the 
majority judgment regarding gender discrimination but submitted that the President 
transgressed the provisions of Section 8(2) of the interim Constitution (the equivalent 
of Section 9(2) of the final Constitution) and that the presumption of unfairness on 
that distinction had not been rebutted. After considering the importance of equality in 
the constitutional scheme as a whole61 and the "persuasive"62 factors that could 
possibly rebut the presumption of unfairness on the ground of gender, Kriegler J 
concluded that:  
 
... the President's ipse dixit establishes that the decision (to implement the 
pardon) was founded on what has come to be known as gender 
stereotyping. And the Constitution enjoins all organs of state – here the 
President – to be careful not to perpetuate the distinctions of the past based 
                                        
57  The court in Fraser para 44 also stressed the "deep disadvantage experienced by the single 
mother in society". 
58  Para 37. 
59  Hugo para 52, confirming Brink v Kitshoff 1996 4 SA 197 (CC) para 44. 
60  Hugo para 66. 
61  Hugo para 74. 
62  Hugo para 85. Kriegler J, however, took care at the same time to emphasise that "am not 
suggesting that gender or sex discrimination of any kind must always and inevitably be found to 
be irrevocably unfair". 
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on gender type-casting. In effect the Act put the stamp of approval of the 
head of State on a perception of parental roles that has been proscribed. 
Mothers are no longer the 'natural' or 'primary' minders of young children in 
the eyes of the law, whatever tradition, prejudice, male chauvinism or 
privilege may maintain. Constitutionally the starting point is that parents are 
parents.63 
 
Yet, it has been held that the discrimination against women in this context can be 
justified in terms of the view that formal equality, as far as parental roles are 
concerned, will not create substantive equality for women who may suffer even more 
if fathers are automatically given parental responsibilities and rights.64 The focus of 
this argument is on the mother's diminished autonomy as a result of having to share 
parental responsibilities and rights with the father of the child. The fear is that while 
mothers will still do all the parenting, fathers will acquire the right to interfere with the 
parenting. In reply to these arguments it is important to emphasise, first of all, that 
the law will not only confer parental rights on the father, but also parental 
responsibilities and that while the acquisition of such responsibilities and rights will 
be automatic, the continued exercise thereof will be conditional upon the best 
interests of the child as the overriding concern. It is conceded that conferring rights 
on all fathers will not necessarily in all cases translate into an increased sharing of 
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the care of the child. However, it must be 
noted that, to the extent that such duties and responsibilities are accepted and 
assumed by the father, doing so can only lessen the burden of mothers. In this way, 
formal equality as far as the acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights are 
concerned could in fact contribute to substantive equality for mothers. 
 
The discrimination against mothers on the ground of marital status is founded upon 
the fact that a married mother shares parental responsibilities and rights with the 
father of the child, while an unmarried mother has to bear the burden on her own.65 
The inequality between married and unmarried mothers arises as a direct 
consequence of the unequal allocation of parental responsibilities and rights to 
mothers and fathers. The discrimination between married and unmarried mothers 
would automatically disappear if mothers and fathers were treated on an equal basis 
                                        
63  Hugo para 85. 
64  See in this regard Sloth-Nielsen and Van Heerden 2003 IJLPF 127. 
65  Heaton "Family Law and the Bill of Rights" para 3C42.3. 
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as far as the allocation of parental responsibilities and rights is concerned. The fact 
that mothers generally bear the burden of caring for their children may justify the 
differential treatment of fathers as legal parents. The question whether it is 
constitutionally justifiable to equalise the position of mothers and fathers as far as the 
allocation of parental responsibilities and rights is concerned will be canvassed in the 
following paragraph. 
 
2.2.3 Discrimination against fathers  
 
2.2.3.1 Discrimination based on sex, gender and marital or equivalent status66 
 
Section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution only creates rights for children, not their parents. 
However, in so far as the biological father is given the right to acquire parental 
responsibilities and rights in terms of Sections 20 and 21 of the Children's Act, he 
may claim an entitlement to the same rights as the biological mother, based on the 
equality provisions contained in Section 9 of the Constitution. The biological father's 
right to claim the same rights as the mother will nevertheless fail if the unequal 
treatment of fathers can be justified. 
 
The law, as amended by the Children's Act, discriminates in the first instance 
between biological fathers and biological mothers in so far as all mothers, regardless 
of their marital status or commitment to their child, automatically acquire parental 
responsibilities and rights based exclusively on their biological relationship to their 
child. If fathers are denied automatic parental responsibilities and rights because 
only females are capable of bearing children, the discrimination seems to have less 
to do with the law's discrimination on ground of sex than nature's discrimination 
against men. The discrimination against fathers has rather been found to lie in the 
prejudicial treatment of fathers arising out of their parenting roles, and is thus based 
on gender.67 Assigning automatic parental responsibilities and rights to all mothers 
and not all fathers at birth is deemed discriminatory because it perpetuates harmful 
stereotypes and "reinforces the message that the law (and society at large) still 
                                        
66  See Deech 1992 Journal of Child Law 3–5, for an excellent human rights assessment of the 
unmarried father's position in the UK. 
67  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 251. 
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sends, namely that child care is a mother's duty and that fathers should not concern 
themselves with child care because it simply is not their job and/or because they are 
incapable of, or unsuited to it".68  
 
The discrimination based on sex and gender has often been said to overlap with 
discrimination based on marital status.69 The court in B v S70 held that in so far as 
the assignment of access (now contact) depends only on the best interests of the 
child and not the respective position of the parents, fathers of extra-marital children 
are in the same position as married fathers and are consequently not discriminated 
against. As pointed out by Pantazis,71 this proposition is unacceptable, since access 
is presumed not to be in the best interests of the child in the case of extra-marital 
children, while in the case of a legitimate child, the assumption is that it is in the best 
interests of the child. In Fraser,72 the court recognised that the existence of marriage 
might have little to do with whether a father involved himself with his children.73 While 
most constitutional commentators74 agree that the unequal allocation of parental 
responsibilities and rights to mothers and fathers may amount to unfair discrimination 
on the grounds of sex, gender and marital status, the Children's Act no longer denies 
fathers equal parenting rights based merely on these grounds.75 A biological father 
who lived with the mother in a permanent life-partnership at the time of the child's 
birth will now also acquire parental responsibilities and rights automatically in the 
same way that a father who is or was married to the mother will acquire.76 The 
intention was clearly to equate the commitment of permanent life-partners with that 
                                        
68  Heaton "Family Law and the Bill of Rights" para 3C42.3. Bonthuys 1999 THRHR 547 549 
contends that "[l]aw constructs the ways in which women are different from men and thus, how 
mothering differs from fathering. It is in this sense that all women are defined as mothers or 
potential mothers and controlled through stereotypes of maternal femininity". See also minority 
judgment of Mokgoro J in Hugo para 93. 
69  Albertyn and Goldblatt "Equality" 35–59. In both the judgments of Du Toit v Minister of Welfare 
and Population Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC) and J v Director-General, Department of 
Home Affairs 2003 5 SA 621 (CC), the unfair discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation 
overlapped with discrimination on the ground of marital status. 
70  1995 3 SA 571 (A) – hereafter B v S. 
71  1996 SALJ 8 19. 
72  Para 44. 
73  Albertyn and Goldblatt "Equality" 35–59. 
74  Sinclair "Family rights" 538–539; Cockrell "The Law of Persons and the Bill of Rights" para 3E25; 
Heaton South African Law of Persons 69; Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 607–608; 
Albertyn and Goldblatt "Equality" 59; Clark and Goldblatt "Gender and family law" 228. 
75  The common law's "sharp" distinction between legitimate and extra-marital children (as noted by 
Cockrell "The Law of Persons and the Bill of Rights" para 3E25) has thus been tempered. 
76  Children's Act 38 of 2005 S 21(1)(a). 
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of spouses for purposes of the allocation of parental responsibilities and rights – 
hence the alternative ground "equivalent status" added to discrimination based on 
marital status. A biological father can now, furthermore, also automatically become 
the legal parent of the child if he can show that he is sufficiently committed to his 
child by not only having identified himself as the father of the child, but also by 
having contributed to the child's upbringing and maintenance.77 The question of 
whether the law is fair in so far as it requires fathers to "qualify" to acquire parental 
responsibilities and rights whereas it does not do so in the case of mothers is, it is 
submitted, now even more complex and nuanced than before.78 While the 
constitutional attack on the commitment requirement could obviously also be based 
on unfair discrimination on the grounds of sex, gender and marital status, since 
mothers do not have to show a similar commitment to be recognised as the legal 
parent of the child, a "lack of commitment" could arguably constitute an independent 
ground on which to attack the constitutionality of the father's legal recognition as a 
parent. If such a ground is recognised, it would have to be treated as an unspecified 
ground and would not benefit from the presumption of unfairness.79 To amount to 
discrimination, the differentiation based on a lack of commitment will thus have to be 
established as unfair and will be considered separately below. 
 
As sex (to the extent that it is applicable), gender and marital or equivalent status are 
all listed grounds, the discrimination would be deemed unfair unless the violation of 
the fathers' right to equality can be justified in terms of Section 36 of the Constitution. 
The question of whether such justification exists has given rise to a range of 
responses from the judiciary and academics in the field, as shown below. 
                                        
77  Children's Act 38 of 2005 S 21(1)(b). 
78  Bainham 1989 IJLPF 228 distinguishes in this regard between so-called "first-class" fathers who 
are married and acquire parental responsibility as a result thereof, "second-class" fathers who 
are unmarried but can graduate to legal parenthood if they can convince the mother and/or the 
court that they deserve this, and "third-class" fathers who are unmarried and have either not tried 
or have failed to convince the mother and/or the court of their worth. 
79  S 9(3) Constitution. 
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Qualified justification for limiting father's right to equality 
Mahomed DP in Fraser80 seemed to think that such gender discrimination could be 
justified, albeit only in the initial period after the child is born. The extent of the bias 
or preference was (further) limited by the court in Madiehe (born Ratlhogo) v 
Madiehe,81 holding that a court would only in case of doubt favour the mother rather 
than the father. The court was adamant that "[c]ustody of a young child is a 
responsibility as well as a privilege and it has to be earned. It is not a gender 
privilege or right."82 The dilution of the so-called "maternal preference rule"83 is also 
evident from cases such as Van der Linde v Van der Linde,84 in which it was held 
that "bemoedering" or mothering is indicative of a function rather than a persona and 
that a father is as capable of mothering a child as a mother.85 Mindful of these 
judicial developments and the obligations imposed by the Constitution, Willis AJ in 
Critchfield86 was of the view that:  
 
... given the fact of pregnancy or, more particularly, the facts of the dynamics 
of pregnancy, it would not amount to unfair discrimination (it would not be 
unconstitutional) for a court to have regard to maternity as a fact in making a 
determination as to the custody of young children. On the other hand, it 
would amount to unfair discrimination (and, correspondingly, be 
unconstitutional) if a court were to place undue (and unfair) weight upon this 
factor when balancing it against other relevant factors. Put simply, it seems 
to me that the only significant consequence of the Constitution when it 
comes to custody disputes is that the Court must be astute to remind itself 
that maternity can never be, willy-nilly, the only consideration of any 
importance in determining the custody of young children. This, as I have 
indicated above, has for a long time been the position in our common law.87 
 
                                        
80  Para 274B–C. 
81  1997 2 All SA 153 (B) 157 f (hereafter Madiehe). 
82  Madiehe 157 f. 
83  According to Willis AJ in Ex parte Critchfield 1999 3 SA 132 (W) 142B (hereafter Critchfield), the 
maternal preference "rule" has never been a rule of law but rather "a statement of judicial 
preference or, if you will, a statement of the prevailing practice and, perhaps, prevailing policy". 
See also Van Heerden "Judicial interference" 534 for a discussion of the "rule" and examples of 
the application thereof in the cases mentioned in n 145. Pantazis 1996 SALJ 9 claims it was the 
development of the maternal preference rule (also referred to as the "tender-years" rule) that 
advanced the recognition of the best interests standard. 
84  1996 3 SA 509 (O) – hereafter Van der Linde. 
85  Van der Linde 515B–H. 
86  Para 143B–D. 
87  See also Van Pletzen v Van Pletzen 1998 4 SA 95 (O) 101C–D; B v M 2006 3 All SA 109 (W) 
para 74: "As far as parenting is concerned we have long since abandoned the 'maternal 
preference rule'"; and K v M 2007 4 All SA 883 (E) para 883. 
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Whereas the "dynamics of pregnancy" is thus only one factor to be considered in a 
custody (now "care") dispute at divorce, it is the determining factor in initially 
assigning sole parental responsibilities and rights to an unmarried mother of a child. 
Despite the fact that, save for the Fraser case, the above-mentioned cases were all 
concerned with the continued exercise of parental responsibilities and rights post 
divorce and not with the initial acquisition thereof88 as such, the judgments do 
demonstrate an increased willingness by the courts to re-evaluate the gender 
stereotyping of parental roles.89 
 
(a) Limitation of father's right to equality fully justified 
Authors such as Cockrell90 however suggest that gender discrimination in the 
automatic allocation of parental responsibilities and rights is justified by deep notions 
                                        
88  Howie JA draws attention to this fact in B v S para 578B, stating that the real issue in that case 
was "whether access was appropriate and not whether access was the father's inherent legal 
right". Sonnekus and Van Westing 1992 THRHR 244 entertain the notion of a loose analogy 
between granting automatic parental rights to unmarried fathers and awarding joint custody to 
parents after divorce. Reference is made to the diminishing enthusiasm for such orders in both 
Europe and America, where the experiment with joint custody orders after divorce has a longer 
history. The disparity between practice and theory in this regard and the negative outcomes of 
such orders are, according to Sonnekus and Van Westing 1992 THRHR 245, evident from 
authors such as Wilkinson Child Custody and Divorce (an American author) who hold the opinion 
that "[w]here there is conflict joint custody is unworkable, and where there is cooperation joint 
custody is unnecessary". Kaganas "Joint custody and equality in South Africa" 184 expresses 
similar concerns about joint custody. 
89  See in this regard Rosen 1978 SALJ 247, who concluded after an (albeit very limited) empirical 
study that there were no significant differences in the adjustment level of children placed in the 
custody of their mother or father post divorce, and Kahn 1978 SALJ 249–250, who commented 
on this article by referring to the position in Australia where the "mother principle" had come 
under attack by the judiciary and authors who concluded that "there is absolutely no evidence to 
support the mother principle. It is belied by the evidence of infanticide, neglect and abuse, and 
the relative success of adopted children over their peers". See Goldberg 1993 SALJ 274, who 
contends that the considerations in the case of unwed parents are incomparable to those at 
divorce: "With divorce, what would be in the best interests of the child would be for the parents 
not to divorce. Yet it is a reality that we have to make the best of. Often that 'best' will be for the 
child to continue seeing his or her father after the separation. With the unwed father no such 
consideration applies in the majority of cases, except where the parties were cohabitees for any 
length of time".  
90  "The Law of Persons and the Bill of Rights" para 3E25. While admitting that it is essential that the 
law recognise the relationship between an extra-marital child and its natural father, Mosikatsana 
1996 CILSA 165, on the other hand, contends that both formal and substantive equality between 
unwed parents may potentially subordinate women. Mosikatsana is of the opinion that equal 
treatment of unwed parents (formal equality) would only give a natural father the option of being 
involved without ensuring that he bears equal responsibility for child rearing. Mosikatsana (164) 
in this regard draws attention to the distinction between caring "for" and caring "about" children, 
pointing out that although either men or women can do both, it is typically women who do the 
caring "for". This author maintains (164) that "[m]ost fathers will not assume equal responsibility 
for child rearing with the mother, no matter how many rights they are granted", concluding (165) 
that "[g]ender neutral rules applied to situations of social and economic inequality, would 
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of substantive equality and should not be held in violation of the father's 
constitutional rights to equality. To overcome the gender discrimination challenge, 
Currie and De Waal91 favour a system that confers parental rights on the de facto 
parent or primary caretaker:92 
 
The question whether sex-specific parental rights unfairly discriminate on the 
basis of gender is complex. On the one hand, affording fathers of children 
the same rights as mothers by abolishing the maternal preference and 
awarding fathers of children born out of wedlock automatic parental rights 
may advance gender equality by encouraging fathers to take an active role 
in the care of their children. Moreover, awarding mothers of children a 
greater share of parental rights merely on the basis of their gender 
perpetuates harmful stereotypes which require women to shoulder the 
burden of childcare. On the other hand, it is well known that mothers actually 
continue to take the primary responsibility for childcare in our society. 
Awarding fathers equal rights may not contribute to actual caring by fathers, 
but instead award fathers legal rights to interfere in mother's childcare 
arrangements.93 In this way, gender-neutral rules may exacerbate the actual 
disadvantage experienced by women in the family. Perhaps a gender neutral 
solution which awards parental rights on the basis of actual childcare work, 
like the primary caretaker standard, could avoid this problem.94 
 
According to Clark,95 a primary caretaker role is established:  
 
... through leading evidence of various factors in relation to the child, such 
as, for example, the preparing and planning of meals; bathing, grooming and 
dressing; medical care; arranging for social interaction after school; 
arranging alternative care – babysitting or daycare, disciplining and 
education. A perceived advantage of the primary-care-taker rule is that it 
may reduce the likelihood of unnecessary litigation and diminish the 
uncertainty of a case-by-case discretionary method. From a feminist 
perspective the primary-care-taker rule does not give the secondary care-
                                                                                                                          
perpetuate existing gender inequalities". Rules of substantive equality would also reinforce 
gender stereotypes by designating women and not men as the primary care givers. According to 
Mosikatsana (165), "the best approach would be to apply legal rules that neither apply false 
gender neutrality nor reinforce gender inequalities". See also Kaganas "Joint custody and 
equality in South Africa" 170. 
91  Bill of Rights Handbook para 27.2(b)(ii). 
92  S 1(1) of the Children's Act employs the term "care-giver" but reserves the term for "any person 
other [own emphasis] than a parent or guardian". As such, the term "care-giver" would be 
inappropriate in the present context in which the possibility of a parent acting as the primary 
carer is specifically contemplated. 
93  This has also been a major factor preventing the creation of an automatic legal status for fathers 
in England. See Bainham 1989 IJLPF 226. 
94  Also see Kaganas "Joint custody and equality in South Africa" 183. 
95  Clark 2000 Stell LR 9–10. 
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taker (usually the man) an opportunity to gain an unfair bargaining 
advantage by trading off custody against maintenance payments, and it is 
sex-neutral: fathers who have been the primary care-takers are not 
disadvantaged ... The main disadvantage ... is that the child may lose 
contact with the non-custodial parent which may not be in the best interest of 
the child.96 
 
Kaganas97 also favours the standard of the primary caretaker, concluding98 as 
follows: 
 
Legal provisions which presume a norm of shared parenting before it has 
become a social reality may reinforce unequal power relations between men 
and women rather than encourage its demise.99 
 
(b) No justification for limiting a father's right to equality 
Sinclair100 proposes transforming the law to reflect a "fundamental premise of 
equality between parents". Sinclair,101 it is submitted correctly, questions women's 
demands for constitutional equality while at the same time still insisting that it would 
be unfair to vest unmarried fathers with inherent parental responsibilities and rights. 
According to her,102 a preference for shared parental responsibilities and rights 
should only be interfered with "[w]here the interests of the child demand judicial 
intervention". In this way, it is argued "[s]tereotyped assumptions that child care is 
woman's work and that fathers do not want to or cannot take care of their children 
would be diminished" as a result of which "[t]he law would be sending the signals 
                                        
96  Other authors such as Wolhuter 1997 Stell LR 65 would rather have the law adopt a so-called via 
media "premised upon the reformulation of a natural father's right of access to encompass both 
shared parenting and a social relationship with the child". See Sinclair "Family rights" 537, who 
indirectly rejects this via media approach (which she describes as the "typical panacea") on the 
basis that what is required is not an approach that reformulates the existing approach or that tries 
to reconcile disparate views on both extremes of the spectrum, but a "comprehensive recrafting 
of the rights and responsibilities of parents and their children, taking into account the justification 
for state intervention to protect widely shared societal values, and also the diversity of cultural 
and religious convictions in our country" (539). 
97  "Joint custody and equality in South Africa" 184.  
98  In support of Boyd "Gender specificity to gender neutrality?" 146. See Kaganas "Joint custody 
and equality in South Africa" 170 n 9 and 184 n 119. 
99  Kaganas "Joint custody and equality in South Africa" 182, referring to an American author, 
Littleton 1987 California LR 1297, agrees that the "function of equality is to make gender 
differences, perceived or actual, costless relative to each other so that people are enabled to 
follow their chosen lifestyles without being punished for following a female lifestyle or rewarded 
for following a male one". 
100  "Family rights" 540. 
101  "Family rights" 540 n 138. 
102  Sinclair "Family rights" 540. 
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that conform to the letter and spirit of the Bill of Rights".103 Although equal parental 
rights and responsibilities would not eliminate competition and conflict between the 
parents, Sinclair104 is convinced that where there is no "war", which in her opinion is 
the norm rather than the exception, "individual men and women would be treated 
alike". 
 
In conclusion, it could be said that in view of the wide range of responses and 
viewpoints held in this regard, it is a moot point whether the unequal treatment of 
committed biological fathers105 as compared to mothers can be justified in terms of 
Section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
 
2.2.3.2 Discrimination based on "lack of commitment" 
 
The question is however whether the differentiation between committed fathers and 
uncommitted fathers, that is those fathers who have not shown the necessary 
commitment in terms of the Children's Act, can be considered unfair discrimination. 
 
While it is admitted that there is a similarity and overlap between the unfairness 
enquiry (in the case of discrimination based on a specified ground) and the enquiry 
into whether the differentiation on an unspecified ground amounts to discrimination 
because both consider the impairment of dignity, the two enquiries apparently have 
different objectives. While the unfairness enquiry has to determine whether a 
particular act of discrimination was unfair, the enquiry relating to an unspecified 
ground has to determine whether the differentiation amounts to discrimination.106 
 
                                        
103  Sinclair "Family rights" 540. See also the proposal by Pantazis 1996 SALJ 8 (testing the 
arguments in B v S 1993 2 SA 211 (W) against the still then applicable interim Constitution) to 
the effect that if the common law rights of a father cannot be changed by a court (because the 
interim Constitution may not have horizontal application) to grant a natural father an inherent 
right of access, the common law should be developed in accordance with the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights to proceed from an assumption of desirability of a relationship 
between father and child rather than the inverse (21), since the presumption of an unmarried 
father's unsuitability strongly influences the decision of what is in a child's interests (19). 
104  "Family rights" 540. 
105  Fathers who have shown their commitment in terms of S 20 and 21 of the Children's Act. 
106  Albertyn and Goldblatt "Equality" 49. 
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A lack of commitment may qualify as an unspecified ground because it is based on 
"attributes or characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental 
dignity of persons as human beings, or to affect them adversely in a comparably 
serious manner".107 The test for unfairness focuses primarily on the impact of the 
differentiation on the complainant and others in his or her situation.108 According to 
the Constitutional Court in Harksen,109 the following factors must be considered to 
determine whether the differentiation has had an unfair impact:110 
 
(a) The position of the complainants in society and whether they have been victims 
of past patterns of discrimination 
Differential treatment that burdens people in a disadvantaged position is more likely 
to be unfair than a burden placed on those who are relatively well off.111 While 
fathers, who have been denied an opportunity to develop a "family life"112 with either 
the mother herself or the child may argue that they have always been at a 
disadvantage,113 uncommitted fathers, save perhaps in so far as they have been 
obliged to support their children out of wedlock, have in a sense been advantaged by 
the law's disregard of them. Because uncommitted fathers have never been allowed 
to acquire parental responsibilities and rights automatically, they have never had a 
legal duty to care for their children.114 In a case in which, however, the father was 
either unaware of his paternity or was prevented by the mother from forming an 
                                        
107  Harksen para 46, as discussed by Albertyn and Goldblatt "Equality" 49. 
108  Harksen para 54. See Albertyn and Goldblatt "Equality" 75. 
109  Para 51. 
110  In stating these guidelines, the court in Harksen para 41 made use of existing equality 
jurisprudence as represented especially by the Constitutional Court's judgments in Prinsloo v 
Van der Linde 1997 3 SA 1012 (CC) and Hugo. 
111  The court in Harksen para 324C–D specifically referred to the judgment in Hugo as an example 
in this regard. 
112  Requiring a father to demonstrate a commitment to his child in order to be recognised as a 
parent may be a way of incorporating the requirement of a family life in terms of A 8 of the ECHR 
into our law: See Van der Linde Grondwetlike Erkenning 477. 
113  See Louw Acquisition of Parental Responsibilities para 4.2.3.1(b), discussing the position of 
unmarried fathers before the enactment of the Children's Act. 
114  As evidenced by the judgment in Jooste. The court gave another reason for not enforcing such a 
duty (209H): "Lex non cogit ad impossibilium. The law will not enforce the impossible. It cannot 
create love and affection where there is none. Not between legitimate children and their parents 
and even less between illegitimate children and their fathers". According to Sloth-Nielsen and 
Van Heerden 2003 IJLPF 127, the case possibly "supports the further development of the notion 
of care as a corollary to parental status, at least as far as natural fathers are concerned". For 
criticism of the judgment, see Bekink and Brand "Constitutional protection of children" 184; Van 
der Linde and Labuschagne 2001 THRHR 308 and sources quoted in Currie and De Waal Bill of 
Rights Handbook 608 n 45. 
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attachment with his child,115 one may very well argue that such differentiation is 
discriminatory because it fundamentally impairs the dignity of such fathers not 
automatically to be recognised as a legal parent from the birth of the child on the 
same basis as mothers.116 
 
Kruger117 would appear to imply, at least as far as being able to acquire rights of 
"access" (now "contact") in respect of their children are concerned,118 that fathers 
have been disadvantaged. She argues that fathers rarely succeed in their application 
for "access", which often involves protracted and expensive litigation.119 The drawn 
out litigation, furthermore, has the potential to alienate and isolate the father from the 
child, resulting in the court ultimately denying the application on the basis that the 
access is no longer in the best interests of the child.120 The same arguments could 
conceivably apply with even more force in the case of a father approaching the court 
for co-guardianship and co-care.121 Furthermore, Van Onselen122 claims that mothers 
are abusing the current legal position in the following ways. Firstly, the "liberated 
female" may elect to bear a child with no intention of permitting the father to play a 
role as part of the family at all. In this case, the father "is left without any rights so he 
cannot perform his function even if he wants to and the mother is possessed of 
awesome legal predominance".123 Secondly, "some women use the weak legal 
position of the father to extort money from the father in exchange for so-called 
                                        
115  Since it is difficult to interpret the meaning of the words "attempted in good faith" as employed in 
S 21(1)(b), it is not entirely clear whether a father who is prevented by the mother from 
contributing to the maintenance and upbringing of the child would be able to satisfy the 
requirements in terms of the said Section. 
116  Van Onselen 1991 De Rebus 501. 
117  1996 THRHR 514. 
118  While many authors are in favour of recognising an inherent right of access (now contact) for 
unmarried fathers, it is not always evident whether such recognition would be supported if 
extended to include the other incidents of parental responsibilities and rights, that is care and 
guardianship. Kruger et al 1993 THRHR 703 and Pantazis 1996 SALJ 17 in express terms limit 
their support for a right of access only, while Goldberg 1996 THRHR 282, on the other hand, 
reflects on the position of the unmarried father in general. The significance of this observation is 
that since the co-exercise of care and guardianship may seem far more threatening to the 
mother's preferred legal position than the co-exercise of contact, it is less likely to be considered 
justifiable at a constitutional level.  
119  Kruger 1996 THRHR 519. 
120  Kruger 1996 THRHR 519, with reference to the judgment in B v S para 587D, wherein the judge 
made the following observation: "If the evidence on remittal shows that time and circumstance 
have driven an unshakeable wedge between [father and child], so be it". 
121  Kruger 1996 THRHR 522 admits to this. 
122  1991 De Rebus 500. 
123  Van Onselen 1991 De Rebus 500. 
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'favours' of access to the child".124 Lastly, "[t]he dominance of the mother's legal 
position interferes with the development of a balanced mother/father relationship vis-
à-vis the child".125  
 
The court in the Hugo case,126 however, by implication found that fathers are not a 
vulnerable group adversely affected by discrimination.127 
 
(b) The nature of the discriminating law or action and the purpose sought to be 
achieved by it 
An important consideration would be whether the primary purpose of the law or 
action is to achieve a worthy and important societal goal. According to Preiss J in 
Fraser,128 the social origins of the rule (that natural fathers do not acquire inherent 
parental responsibilities and rights in respect of their children born out of wedlock) 
may have been based upon a desire to preserve or encourage the formation of the 
family unit for the benefit of children, or designed to punish profligate men or to 
discourage the irresponsible procreation of children. Hughes129 summarises the 
reasons for societies wanting to channel sexuality into legitimate marriages as 
threefold: 
(i)  the economic motive – to maintain property within the family group;  
(ii)  the political motive – to accumulate power and influence by a carefully 
conducted policy of marriage alliances; and 
(iii) the moralistic motive – to enforce the primarily religious exhortations to 
sexual renunciation.130 
 
As stated by Van Onselen,131 "these objectives would appear to have failed largely 
or at least to have been ineffective".132 Pantazis133 moreover submits that none of 
                                        
124  Van Onselen 1991 De Rebus 500. 
125  Van Onselen 1991 De Rebus 500. Supporting this view, Kruger 1996 THRHR 519 contends: 
"Daar word vandag algemeen deur gedragswetenskaplikes aanvaar dat 'n kind 'n vader en 'n 
moeder nodig het vir die ontwikkeling van 'n eie persoonlikheid en identiteit". See also Eckhard 
1992 TSAR 125 and Labuschagne 1993 THRHR 421 in this regard. 
126  Para 52. 
127  See Harksen para 64, in which Goldstone J reviewed the reasoning in the Hugo case. 
128  1997 2 SA 218 (T) para 234H. 
129  "Law, religion and bastardy" 4–6.  
130  Pantazis 1996 SALJ 10. 
131  1991 De Rebus 500. 
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these reasons is an acceptable basis for treating children born of unmarried parents 
differently in law because it is "unacceptable to punish the child for the sin of the 
father". While the denial of granting fathers equal parental rights merely on the basis 
that they have not married the mothers of their children can easily be dismissed as 
not achieving "a worthy and societal goal", the question is considerably more 
complex in the present dispensation where all that is required from fathers is that 
they demonstrate some form of commitment to either the mother or the child. Is it 
unfair to exclude fathers who have not shown such commitment – especially given 
the fact that uncommitted fathers can still acquire parental responsibilities and rights 
by agreement or by order of court?  
 
Albertyn and Goldblatt134 suggest that the constitutionality of the mother's preferred 
legal position with regard to her children may ultimately depend on the specific 
strategy chosen – "whether the lack of involvement of fathers in their children's lives 
should be punished by the law or whether the law should be used to encourage 
greater involvement" – which will of course not necessarily mean that these fathers 
will in fact be more involved. 
 
It could be argued that the societal goal achieved by the Children's Act is, in the first 
place, to protect mothers who are in general still the primary caretakers of children. 
The problem with this argument is that it is parent centred and, by implication, 
gender specific. What is best for the mother will not always be best for the child. A 
second argument that will probably have more force, because of the obligation in 
terms of Section 28(2) of the Constitution, is to contend that excluding an 
uncommitted father from automatically acquiring parental responsibilities and rights 
in respect of his child is generally in the best interests of the child. 
 
However, the vagueness of the criteria for the automatic acquisition of parental 
responsibilities and rights by fathers makes it very difficult to determine with absolute 
certainty whether a particular father will fall within the ambit of the section. In terms 
of Section 21(1)(a), for example, the biological father must be living in a "permanent 
                                                                                                                          
132  As also noted by Kruger 1996 THRHR 519. 
133  1996 SALJ 10. 
134  "Equality" 59. 
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life-partnership" with the mother – a concept that is not defined for purposes of the 
Children's Act and which has no fixed content.135 A further problem is the 
arbitrariness of the criteria. Requiring the father to have cohabited with the mother 
"at birth" would only be one such example.136 It is submitted that the uncertainty 
created by the provisions contained in Section 21 outweighs the ostensible 
protection of children against uncommitted fathers. 
 
The advantage of vesting parental responsibilities and rights in both parents at birth 
is that should the mother die or for some reason disappear the father could 
automatically act as caretaker and guardian. The present dispensation would 
necessitate a High Court application with its attendant costs. 
 
The concern that "a capricious man would use such undeserved status to badger the 
woman whom he has left – perhaps happily so – to bring up his children unaided"137 
is at least partially dispelled by the fact that co-holders of parental responsibilities 
and rights can act "without the consent of the other co-holder or holders when 
exercising those parental responsibilities and rights".138 It must, however, be 
conceded that this general principle is tempered by Section 18 in terms of which co-
guardians will both have to consent to the child's marriage, adoption, relocation, 
passport application and alienation or encumbrance of the child's immovable 
property. Major decisions involving the child will, therefore, have to be made with due 
consideration of any views and wishes expressed by any co-holder of parental 
responsibilities and rights.139  
 
The purpose sought to be achieved by limiting a father's right to automatic parental 
responsibilities and rights seems to have more to do with protecting the mother's 
vested interests than putting the interests of children first. It goes without saying that 
                                        
135  For details regarding the problematic nature of this concept, see Louw Acquisition of Parental 
Responsibilities 116–117. 
136  S 21(1)(a) Children's Act. For a detailed discussion of other problematic provisions in S 21, see 
Louw Acquisition of Parental Responsibilities 117–122. 
137  Barton 1998 Solicitors Journal 401. 
138  S 30 Children's Act. 
139  S 31(2)(a) Children's Act 38. A major decision is defined as "any decision which is likely to 
change significantly, or to have a significant adverse effect on, the co-holder's exercise of 
parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child" – S 31(2)(b). 
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formal equality between parents in this respect would allow patently obvious 
unsuitable fathers to be vested with parental responsibilities and rights – but the 
same is happening at the moment in the case of mothers. 
 
In the process of evaluating the criteria to be applied when assigning parental 
responsibilities and rights to the biological parents of a child by operation of law, it is 
considered essential to remain focused on the purpose and function of such 
assignment, that is to ensure that every child is assigned a legal parent at birth and 
to bear in mind that such assignment may be judicially varied, terminated or 
reassigned over time, depending on the best interests of the child.140 It is submitted 
that the law should allow both parents to assume parental responsibilities and rights 
by operation of law, since that would provide the child with the most extensive 
potential protective net. To allow the mother to manipulate the child's relationship 
with its father seems overtly unfair.141 It is only in those instances in which a parent 
fails to make use of a given opportunity to develop a relationship with his or her child 
that the responsibility entrusted to the particular parent should be limited or denied. 
In this way, a negative outcome is not anticipated or prejudged – each parent would 
have to take responsibility for his or her own lack of commitment to the child.142 It 
may also, in practice at least, be marginally easier to show a failure to commit to the 
child from birth than to prove a commitment to the mother or the child as required by 
                                        
140  The thoughts expressed here were at least partly inspired by the following observation of the 
Scottish Law Commission as quoted by Lowe 1997 IJLPF 192 at 199: "The question is whether 
the starting point should be that the father has, or has not, the normal parental responsibilities 
and rights. Given that about 25 percent of all children born in Scotland in recent years have been 
born out of wedlock, and that the number of couples cohabitating outside marriage is now 
substantial, it seems to us that the balance has now swung in favour of the view that parents are 
parents, whether married to each other or not. If in any particular case it is in the best interest of 
a child that a parent should be deprived of some or all of his or her parental responsibilities and 
rights that can be achieved by means of a court order". In this context, it is submitted, the 
concept of "revocable" responsibility seems to be apposite: Lowe 1997 IJLPF 192 at 207, 
referring to Conway 1996 NLJ 782.  
141  Eckhard 1992 TSAR 129 is of the opinion that this approach amounts to an unacceptable 
limitation of the discretion of the court that would be bound by what the mother sees as the future 
for the child. According to Meulders-Klein 1990 IJLF 131 at 150, an approach which focuses on 
the position of the father vis-à-vis that of the mother in terms of their respective powers should be 
avoided because it is "divisive and therefore destructive". 
142  This approach would also obviate the need of one parent to prove the other parent's unsuitability 
or incompetency in order to acquire parental responsibilities and rights. Such an attack can only 
increase the animosity between the already incompatible parents and make it more difficult to 
exercise shared parental responsibilities and rights in future: Eckhard 1992 TSAR 131. 
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Section 21 of the Children's Act.143 In short, it may be easier to determine what is not 
in the child's best interests with reference to the history of the relationship between 
that child and its mother and father than to predict and predetermine whether such a 
relationship will in future be in the best interests of the child.144 The only real and 
obvious drawback of this approach is that it may in practice mean that the mother, 
who generally seems to remain the primary caretaker, will have to cope with the 
(mostly) unwelcome involvement of the father in the life of the child,145 at least as far 
as the responsibilities and rights of guardianship and taking major decisions 
concerning the child is concerned. Proponents of the "substantive equality" argument 
would be justified in regarding this as further discrimination against the mother based 
on sex and especially gender. However, if the focus is shifted to that of the child in 
question, as required by Section 28(2) of the Constitution,146 then such an approach 
would seem to be the only constitutionally viable one.147 After all, expecting a father 
who wants to develop a relationship with his child to approach the court to acquire 
legal recognition may seem as unreasonable as expecting a mother to prevent such 
legal recognition.148  
 
                                        
143  In this regard, the stated preference (in McCall v McCall 1994 (3) SA 201 (C)) for maintaining the 
status quo in so far as the care of the child is concerned, should also be mentioned. As Bainham 
1989 IJLPF 233 so aptly observes: "The father will almost certainly be in a weaker position in 
arguing that the status quo should be disturbed than he would be if he was instead resisting a 
change in the status quo". 
144  Eckhard 1992 TSAR 128. 
145  Pantazis 1996 SALJ 14. 
146  Bainham 1989 IJLPF 234 points out that the current protection of unmarried mothers from 
adverse behaviour of fathers assumes that the interests of the mother and child are synonymous 
which is not unlike the equally dogmatic nineteenth century attitude which equated children's 
interests with their fathers' and concludes that "the principle which informs modern child law is 
not that the interests of mothers and fathers are paramount, but that the interests of children are". 
147  Apart from A 18 of the UNCRC, the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Marckx 
v Belgium 1979 2 EHRR 330 and Johnston v Ireland 1986 9 EHRR 203 have made it clear that 
the fundamental rule is that "every child has the fundamental rights to have a normal family life, 
that is to say, a father and a mother with whom he has a personal relationship": Meulders-Klein 
1990 IJLF 131 at 151. 
148  With reference only to the natural father's right of access, Wolhuter 1997 Stell LR 65 at 78 is, 
however, of the opinion that the mother should only bear the evidential burden to prove the 
father's unfitness once he "has discharged the onus of proving that he has a social relationship 
with his child and is committed to shared parenting". Despite holding that there may be serious 
other risks in granting fathers automatic rights (of access (at 268)), Goldberg 1993 SALJ 261 
admits that the difficulty of getting access to court "could be equally problematic for fathers" (at 
267). 
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(c) The extent to which the rights of the complainant have been impaired and 
whether there has been an impairment of his or her fundamental dignity149 
The legislative scheme differentiating between mothers and fathers as far as the 
acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights is concerned can be said to 
perpetuate the image of natural fathers as "fly by night" progenitors who are 
disinterested in their children and shirk their financial obligations.150 Uncommitted 
biological fathers are thus by implication in law regarded as lesser parents with 
inherently deficient parenting skills,151 while all biological mothers are initially 
irrefutably presumed to be capable of assuming the role of legal parenthood. The 
effect of the discrimination is that the mere existence of a biological link creates a 
relationship of parent and child in the one case but not in the other.152 As such, the 
limitation of the father's right to be treated equally as a parent may well be an affront 
to his dignity. This will especially be so in cases in which the father was not aware of 
his paternity or the mother has refused him the opportunity to develop a relationship 
with herself or with the child. 
 
Despite the fact that the limitation does not negate the possibility of fathers acquiring 
parental responsibilities and rights, Sections 20 and 21 still preclude the automatic 
acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights on the same basis as mothers in 
terms of Section 19. While fathers should not be allowed to exercise parental 
responsibilities and rights if it is detrimental to the interests of his children, they 
should at least be dignified with the same opportunity of acquiring such 
responsibilities and rights at the birth of the child. 
                                        
149  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 245. 
150  Goldberg 1993 SALJ 261 at 274 calls them "uncaring rascal(s)". 
151  Mosikatsana 1996 CILSA 152. See also the minority judgment of Mokgoro J in Hugo 92 who 
contended that not releasing fathers of children from prison on the same basis as mothers "does 
not recognise the equal worth of fathers who are actively involved in nurturing and caring for their 
young children, treating them as less capable parents on the mere basis that they are fathers 
and not mothers". With reference to the American case of Stanley v Illinois 405 US 645 (1972), 
Pantazis 1996 SALJ 17 observes: "Given the importance of the parent's interest, it is 
unconstitutional to presume parental unfitness; it has to be established on an individual basis". 
One may then surely ask but what about the presumption of fitness in the case of a mother? Is 
that constitutional? 
152  J v Director-General 2003 5 SA 605 (D) para 27 (hereafter J v Director-General). 
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2.3 Constitutional rights of children 
 
The inequality in the ex lege assignment of parental responsibilities and rights may 
have a more deleterious effect on the constitutional (and international) rights of 
children than on the rights of their parents. Denying a child the right to have both its 
parents recognised by law on an equal basis could, as indicated above, be seen as 
unfair discrimination, a limitation of the child's constitutional rights to parental care 
(embodied in Section 28(1)(b)) and could arguably also inhibit an approach 
dedicated to pursuing the best interests of the child (in terms of Section 28(2) of the 
Constitution). 
 
2.3.1 Unfair discrimination against children? 
 
The possible discrimination against children on the grounds of their social origin and 
birth is based on the differentiation between children born to parents who are either 
committed to each other and/or their child in a specific way and children born to 
parents who are not so committed. In particular, the discrimination is against those 
children whose father is or was not married to their mother, did not live with their 
mother at birth or has not shown a commitment to the children themselves, as 
prescribed by Section 21. The Children's Act has thus to a large extent minimised 
the possible discrimination against children, since the differentiation between 
children is no longer made with reference only to their parents' marital status.  
 
The Constitutional Court in Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; and South 
African Human Rights Commission v President of the Republic of South Africa153 
found Section 23 of the Black Administration Act154 and the customary law rule of 
primogeniture in its application to intestate succession unconstitutional in so far as it 
unfairly discriminated against extra-marital daughters to qualify as heirs in the 
intestate estate of their deceased father in terms of the Constitution's equality 
provisions (Section 9), the right to human dignity (Section 10) and the rights of 
                                        
153  2005 1 SA 580 (CC) – hereafter Bhe. 
154  38 of 1927. 
A LOUW                   PER / PELJ  2010(13)3 
 
185/508 
 
children under Section 28 of the Constitution.155 The court held that children could 
not be subjected to discrimination on grounds of sex and birth in terms of Section 9 
of the Constitution. The customary law rule of primogeniture prevented all female 
children from inheriting intestate and significantly curtailed the rights of extra-marital 
male children in this regard.156 In its consideration of the constitutional rights of 
children implicated in the case,157 the court gave special attention to the question 
"whether the differential entitlements of children born within marriage and those born 
extra-maritally constitutes unfair discrimination".158 In so far as the answer to this 
question could be based on the interpretation of Section 28 and other rights in the 
Constitution, the court held that the provisions of international law must be 
considered, since: "South Africa is a party to a number of multilateral agreements 
designed to strengthen the protection of children."159 In the general context of 
according natural fathers equal rights to those of mothers, the court made the 
following important comments: 160 
 
The European Court on Human Rights has held that treating extra-marital 
children differently to those born within marriage constitutes a suspect 
ground of differentiation in terms of art 14 of the [African] Charter161 [on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child]. The United States Supreme Court, too, has 
held that discriminating on the grounds of 'illegitimacy' is 'illogical' and 
'unjust'. 
 
Describing the position of extra-marital children in South Africa, the court concluded 
that:162  
 
… extra-marital children did, and still do, suffer from social stigma and 
impairment of dignity. The prohibition of unfair discrimination in our 
Constitution is aimed at removing such patterns of stigma from our society. 
Thus when 9(3) prohibits unfair discrimination on the ground of 'birth', it 
                                        
155  Bhe para 100. 
156  Bhe para 88. 
157  Bhe paras 47–59. 
158  Bhe para 54. 
159  Bhe para 55. 
160  Bhe para 56, referring to Weber v Aetna Casualty and Surety Co 406 US 164 (1972) para 175; 
Levy v Louisiana 391 US 68 (1968); Glona v American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Co 391 
US 73 (1968) para 76 and Trimble v Gordon 430 US 762 (1977). 
161  The court referred to the judgments of Marckx v Belgium 1979 2 EHRR 330 paras 38–39 and 
Inze v Austria 1987 10 EHRR 394 para 41, in this regard. 
162  Bhe para 59. 
A LOUW                   PER / PELJ  2010(13)3 
 
186/508 
 
should be interpreted to include a prohibition of differentiation between 
children on the grounds of whether the children's parents were married at the 
time of conception or birth. Where differentiation is made on such grounds, it 
will be assumed unfair unless it is established that it is not.163 
 
In Petersen v Maintenance Officer, Simon's Town Maintenance Court,164 the court 
held:165 
 
I am of the opinion that this common-law rule, which differentiates between 
children born in wedlock and extra-marital children, not only denies extra-
marital children an equal right to be maintained by their paternal 
grandparents, but conveys the notion that they do not have the same 
inherent worth and dignity as children who are born in wedlock. 
 
The court added that the common-law rule was also contrary to the best interests of 
the child and that it followed that: "it violates the constitutional rights of extra-marital 
children, and in particular, the rights enshrined in Sections 9, 10 and 28(2) of the 
Constitution".166 
 
Although both of these cases focused on the rights of children and not the rights of 
parents or natural fathers, these comments undeniably support an egalitarian 
approach that disregards sex and marital status in the determination of the parent–
child relationship. Whether the judgment could be interpreted as supporting an 
approach in terms of which the parents of the child are placed on an equal footing as 
far as the automatic acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights is concerned, is 
debatable. The creation of such a blanket rule was not considered appropriate in the 
Fraser case,167 where a "nuanced" approach was advocated. The court in that case 
seemed to intimate that the right to parental care should be qualified by an inference 
that the right should only apply to committed parental care as now embodied in 
Sections 20 and 21 of the Children's Act. 
                                        
163  Also see Pantazis 1996 SALJ 12. 
164  2004 2 SA 56 (C) – hereafter Petersen v Maintenance Officer. 
165  Petersen v Maintenance Officer 19. 
166  Petersen v Maintenance Officer 21. 
167  Para 29. 
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2.3.2 Infringement of a child's rights in terms of Section 28 of the Constitution 
 
If it is argued that the differentiation between mothers and fathers as far as the 
acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights is concerned constitutes an 
infringement of a child's right to parental care,168 the question would be whether such 
infringement can be justified in terms of Section 36 of the Constitution. A further 
question is whether the infringement of the child's right to parental care can be 
considered as giving paramountcy to the best interests of a child.169 The limitation 
analysis in terms of Section 36 of the Constitution involves a proportionality enquiry. 
The balancing exercise in this case requires that the purpose, effect and importance 
of the denial of automatic parental responsibilities and rights to uncommitted fathers, 
on the one hand, be weighed up against the nature and effect of the impairment 
caused to the children's rights, on the other. The limitation analysis will be 
considered with reference to the factors mentioned in Section 36(1) of the 
Constitution170 and the best interests of the child. 
 
2.3.2.1 The nature of the right to parental care171 and the best interests of the 
child 
 
The nature of the right to parental care is apparent from the words "parental" and 
"care". It is submitted that "care" in this context should be given a wide interpretation 
as including both the intangible aspects of the parent–child relationship, such as 
"love, attention and affection",172 and the more tangible or economic aspects of the 
relationship of providing for the child's physical needs. While it would admittedly be 
difficult, if not impossible, to enforce the intangible component of the relationship 
between parent and child because of its highly personal nature,173 this does not 
                                        
168  S 28(1)(b) Constitution. 
169  As required by S 28(2) of the Constitution. The court in J v Director-General para 8 interpreted 
"paramount" as it is used in S 28(2) to mean that "the interests of the children are not merely 
important – they override all other considerations in cases concerning children". The statement 
was later qualified by the Constitutional Court in S v M 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 26 to the 
effect that "the fact that the best interests of the child are paramount does not mean that they are 
absolute". 
170  See the discussion in 2.2 above. 
171  See S 36(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
172  Jooste para 201D–E. 
173  See Jooste para 209H. 
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mean, as correctly pointed out by Heaton,174 that the right should not be recognised. 
In fact, the right and the responsibility to care, as defined in the Children's Act, 
appear mainly to be comprised of intangibles.175  
 
A further question that is important for the present investigation is whether the right 
to "care" also includes a right to legal "care" or assistance, that is a right to parental 
guardianship. In so far as the right and responsibility of guardianship would be 
necessary to provide sufficient "care" of a child, it could be argued to fall within the 
ambit of the right to parental care. 
 
The adjective "parental" means "of or characteristic of a parent or parents".176 The 
word "parent" means to bring forth, to bear or to beget and includes a natural or 
biological father and mother.177 "Parental" care consequently refers to the care 
ordinarily associated with or similar in nature to care provided by a biological parent 
or the biological parents in respect of their offspring. A child would by necessary 
implication also have a right to care by a person other than a parent.178 While 
Section 28(1)(b) would thus not generally speaking necessarily include a right to 
parental care by both parents of a child, it could be seen as implicit in the Section if 
interpreted against the backdrop of the UNCRC, from which it derives.179 The use of 
the gender neutral term "parent(al)" cannot be interpreted as giving preference to 
either the mother or the father. Similarly, the inference that the section only 
recognises the right or duty to care in respect of a parent who has custody180 cannot 
be justified considering the absence of any qualification to the child's right to parental 
care in Section 28(1)(b) itself.181 Since a child only becomes a legal subject at birth, 
                                        
174   "Family Law and the Bill of Rights" para 3C36. 
175  See definition of "care" in the Children's Act: S 1(1) sv "care", which includes reference to both 
tangible aspects (in (a)) and intangible aspects (in (b) to (j)). 
176  Webster's Dictionary sv "parental". 
177  Webster's Dictionary sv "parent"; Pearsall Concise Oxford Dictionary sv "parent"; Claassen 
Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases sv "parent"; Garner Handbook of Family Law Terms sv 
"parent". 
178  The court in SW v F 1997 1 SA 796 (O) para 802G–H confirmed that the right to parental care 
not only referred to care by natural parents. 
179  A 18 of the UNCRC promotes the principle that both parents have common responsibilities in 
raising their children. 
180  See Jooste para 208F. 
181  Unless the judgment in Jooste is read as implying that only fathers who have automatically 
acquired parental responsibilities and rights (and, therefore, "custody" or care) have a duty to 
care for the child. If the judgment is interpreted in this way, it would explain why the duty to care 
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the child will have a right to parental care as from the moment of its birth. While it is 
acknowledged that families in South Africa take many different forms, children have 
a right not to be discriminated against on the ground of their birth or social origin.182 
Every child should thus have a right to parental care by both its parents as from birth, 
regardless of the relationship (or lack of a relationship) between the parents 
themselves or, for that matter, between the child and its parent.  
 
The right to parental care is however not absolute. It is, in the first place, dependent 
on the best interests of the child as provided for in Section 28(2) of the Constitution. 
As such, the right to parental care can in a given case be limited or even denied if 
doing so is deemed to be in the best interests of the particular child concerned. The 
right to parental care can, furthermore, like any other constitutional right, be limited 
by a law of general application to the extent that it is reasonable and justifiable as 
prescribed by Section 36 of the Constitution. The Children's Act is such a law and, 
while it does not limit a child's right to maternal care, it limits a child's right to paternal 
care. As far as the child's right to paternal care is concerned, the right is only 
recognised in the case of a father who has shown the necessary commitment to 
either the mother or the child as provided for in Sections 20 and 21. While limiting 
the child's right to paternal care may in a given case be considered in the best 
interests of that particular child, the question is whether the blanket limitation (limiting 
all children's right to paternal care in this specific way) can, generally speaking, be 
justified in terms of Section 36. 
 
2.3.2.2 The importance of the purpose of the limitation of the child's right to 
parental care183 and the best interests of the child 
 
While the acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights is always subject to the 
best interests of the child concerned, it would be impracticable to delay the initial 
allocation of parental responsibilities and rights pending the outcome of a 
determination of the best interests of each child born in South Africa. In deciding who 
                                                                                                                          
for a child cannot be enforced against a father who has not acquired any parental responsibilities 
and rights. Also see comments in n 115 above. 
182  S 9(3) of the Constitution. 
183  S 36(1)(b) Constitution. 
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should automatically be vested with parental responsibilities and rights at birth, the 
law must thus, for practical reasons, make certain basic assumptions as to what 
would generally be in the best interests of children. The difficulty in making such 
assumptions is that there will always be cases in which the assumption will prove to 
be wrong: while it may be in the best interests of one child to have two legal parents 
from birth, it may not always be so for another. The challenge is thus to formulate a 
flexible rule that allows for exceptional cases. In a case in which the rule allows for 
the acquisition of responsibilities and rights by the parent by operation of law, that is 
automatically, it is very difficult to devise a mechanism in terms of which the 
exceptional cases can be identified and accommodated. For this reason, it is 
submitted that the rules providing for the ex lege assignment of parental 
responsibilities and rights at the time of the child's birth should be clear and simple, 
and provide for a method of determining legal parenthood with the utmost degree of 
certainty – most of which is lacking in the new scheme devised by the Children's 
Act.184  
 
The purpose of preventing uncommitted fathers from automatically acquiring 
parental responsibilities and rights is mainly to protect the stability of the relationship 
between children and their mothers as the primary caretakers of children. Protecting 
this relationship is important in circumstances in which the arbitrary and inconsistent 
involvement of the father would be prejudicial to the child's welfare. However, it 
cannot be denied that while the best interests of the child are often identical to the 
interests of the mother, this is not always the case.185 The negative effect that the 
sharing of parental responsibilities and rights with the father might have on the 
mother must be offset against the advantages for the child in developing and 
maintaining a relationship with its father. 
                                        
184  S 21 Children's Act. 
185  Pantazis 1996 SALJ 14, referring only to the right of "access", is of the opinion that: "Given the 
importance of contact between child and father, it is not reasonable to generalise this potential 
clash into a rule of law that denies automatic access". Bonthuys 1997 SAJHR 631 is however of 
the opinion that the ideologies of the new, participating father, and the need for the presence of a 
father in the 'family' "are conveniently accommodated within the elastic concept of the best 
interests of the child" and is critical of "[b]iological assumptions" that "serve as authority for views 
about qualities deemed inherent in fatherhood and motherhood, and about the needs of all 
children and families for fathers" (at 632). See the discussion in 1.4.3 above in this regard. Currie 
and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 620 and Bonthuys 1997 SAJHR 622 contend that the best 
interests standard is simply a vehicle for parental interests. 
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2.3.2.3 The nature and extent of the limitation of the child's right to parental 
care186 and the best interests of the child 
 
A child's right to parental care, should the child be born to married parents, is limited 
in so far as it excludes the right of that child to have both the mother and the father of 
the child automatically recognised as the child's legal parents. In a case in which a 
father has not shown any demonstrable commitment to his child or the mother of his 
child, as provided for in Sections 20 and 21 of the Children's Act, he will not by law 
be recognised as the father of the child. The law's disregard of such fathers will thus 
simply reflect the reality of the situation. As far as the mother of the child is 
concerned, she will become the legal parent of the child even if she displays no 
interest at all in the child or its welfare – provided of course the mother does not 
decide to terminate her pregnancy. 
 
While a father can elect not to be legally recognised as the child's parent by simply 
dropping out of the picture, his position is rather precarious if he actually wants to be 
legally recognised as the child's father. His recognition will to a large extent depend 
on the mother's co-operation. If she is willing, the father can marry the mother or live 
with her at the time of the child's birth – not before or after. If this is not possible, the 
father can take the steps outlined in Section 21 to acquire parental responsibilities 
and rights. The mother can also confer parental responsibilities and rights on him by 
agreement. If the mother does not wish the father to be recognised, she can refuse 
to marry him or live with him. She can refuse to allow him to develop a relationship 
with the child or to confer rights on him by agreement. The problem is thus not 
excluding uncommitted fathers from caring but allowing fathers who want to care and 
be legally recognised as the child's father the opportunity to do so without 
necessarily making it dependent on the mother's (or ultimately a court's) view of what 
is in the best interests of the child. 
 
Although dealing with a same-sex partner, the following observations made by the 
court in J v Director-General can apply with equal force in the present context as far 
                                        
186  S 36(1)(c) Constitution. 
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as the disadvantages in not automatically being recognised as the parent of a child 
are concerned: 
 
(a) If the relationship between the parents is terminated, the partner, or father in the 
present context, will have no automatic right of access to the child and the child 
will not automatically have a right of access to him.187 
(b) A testamentary appointment as guardian after the death of the mother will not 
ensure that the biological father will become the guardian, since the 
testamentary nomination can be revoked at any time, in which event the child 
might be left without any guardian at all.188  
(c) In cases of emergency, such as a medical emergency, it might well be vital in the 
interests of the children that the father be entitled to give the requisite consent if, 
for whatever reason, the mother becomes unavailable to give such consent.189  
(d) The court also stressed the importance of having "two parents and guardians 
rather than one".190  
 
The court in J v Director-General finally concluded that, as a natural parent, the 
partner's right to human dignity in terms of Section 10 of the Constitution and the 
children's right to parental care in terms of Section 28(1)(b) demand that her claim be 
recognised by law.191 The same argument is applicable in the case of a biological 
father.  
 
2.3.2.4 The relation between the limitation of the child's right to parental care 
and its purpose192 and the best interests of the child 
 
It appears that the legislature has opted for a compromise between the complete 
insulation of the mother–child relationship against outside interference, on the one 
hand, and the automatic recognition of all fathers as legal parents on the same 
(biological) basis as mothers, on the other. The legislation has thus attempted to 
                                        
187  J v Director-General para 20. 
188  J v Director-General para 20. 
189  J v Director-General para 20. 
190  J v Director-General para 20. 
191  J v Director-General para 22. 
192  See S 36(1)(d) of the Constitution. 
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adopt a more nuanced approach193 to the automatic acquisition of parental 
responsibilities and rights by acknowledging the varying degrees of commitment that 
can be displayed by fathers. In so doing, the Children's Act aims to protect the 
stability of the environment created by the mother as primary caregiver while at the 
same time accommodating the advantage that a relationship with a committed father 
may have for the child. It is submitted that the new provisions will fail on both 
accounts (indicated in italics) for the following reasons: 
 
(a) While it is laudable that the Children's Act no longer limits the recognition of 
fathers to those who have married the mothers of their children, it should be 
clear by now that a demonstrable commitment shown towards the mother, 
whether by means of marriage or other informal life-partnership, is no indication 
that the father will assume responsibility for the children born from such a union. 
The degree of commitment by the father cannot be predicated on the 
commitment to the mother and should thus be irrelevant for purposes of bringing 
into life a legal relationship between child and father.194 The uncertainty caused 
by the undefined notion of a "permanent life-partnership" as an alternative to 
marriage merely complicates the issue and creates new problems. Whether 
parents are married or not, separated or not or whatever their specific family 
situation may be, the existence of the biological link between a parent and child 
raises an expectation of entitlement – for both parent and child. In those 
instances in which such expectations are frustrated by one parent, the other 
parent will feel wronged irrespective of whether the initial expectations have legal 
sanction or not.195 The best interests standard is currently the only guiding 
principle to settle the ensuing dispute. If the starting point is the same as in the 
case of children born of married parents, that is that both parents automatically 
acquire parental responsibilities and rights at birth and that shared parental 
responsibilities and rights is a fortiori deemed to be in the best interests of 
                                        
193  As advocated in Fraser para 29. 
194  According to Bainham 1989 IJLPF 236, the attempt to distinguish between responsible and 
irresponsible unmarried fathers is arbitrary since "there is no way of proving a correlation 
between stable cohabitation and responsible behaviour". Palmer 1996 SALJ 579 seems to 
sympathise with this line of thinking. 
195  Pantazis 1996 SALJ 13. 
A LOUW                   PER / PELJ  2010(13)3 
 
194/508 
 
children, the law can, as is being done in Australia, focus on measures to 
mediate the disputes, if and when they arise.196 
 
(b) While a commitment to the child is considered significant for purposes of 
creating a legal relationship between father and child, the criteria contained in 
Section 21(1)(b) are so fraught with difficulties that they will fail to provide a 
proper screening mechanism for such commitment and will only lead to 
increased animosity and litigation. It is submitted that the increased litigation 
resulting from the problems inherent in the interpretation and application of 
Section 21 will do little to further the best interests of the child. While the initial 
assignment of parental responsibilities and rights to both biological parents will 
not be without its problems, the disputes which will inevitably arise will at least 
require the courts to focus on the manner in which to best to further the interests 
of the child in the particular case, rather than oblige the courts first to settle a 
dispute between the parents arguing about whether they in fact have the 
(parental) right to involve themselves in the child's interests in the first place. 
 
(c) Especially disconcerting is the fact that the provisions apply to children who were 
born before the Children's Act came into operation. This implies that a father 
may now assume equal and shared parental responsibilities and rights with the 
mother based on circumstances that existed at the time of the birth of the child – 
which could be many years ago. In such a case, the recognition of the father 
may definitely have a destabilising effect on the mother–child relationship. 
 
2.3.2.5 Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose197 
 
The exclusion of uncommitted fathers from acquiring parental responsibilities and 
rights automatically does not completely extinguish the possibility of acquiring 
parental responsibilities and rights – the father may still be assigned such parental 
                                        
196  In so far as an order for joint custody at divorce is comparable to equality in the acquisition of 
parental responsibilities and rights, Kaganas "Joint custody and equality in South Africa" 179 
holds the view that "given the shift in emphasis in welfare discourse towards the importance of 
fatherhood and shared parenting, joint custody can be perceived as serving the interests of both 
welfare and justice". 
197  S 36(1)(e) Constitution. 
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responsibilities and rights by means of a parental responsibilities and rights 
agreement or by order of court. The court in J v Director-General198 however held 
that the constitutionality of legislation does not depend on whether the litigant has a 
satisfactory alternative remedy. 
 
3 Conclusion 
 
When the respective rights are finally weighed up against each other, it would seem 
as though the limitation of the parents' right to equality is currently justified by the 
child's overriding right to parental care, which in terms of the best interests standard 
is currently limited to committed parental care, as defined by Sections 20 and 21 of 
the Children's Act.199 It has, however, been argued that the differential treatment of 
mothers and fathers, as far as the acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights is 
concerned, may not be constitutionally justifiable. Conferring full parental 
responsibilities and rights on both parents based on their biological link to the child 
would not only be in line with worldwide trends,200 but would also meet the 
constitutional demands of substantive sex and gender equality. It would furthermore 
place the focus on the best interests of the child, which emphasises the importance 
of both parents for the child.201 
                                        
198  Para 28. 
199  See Wolhuter 1997 Stell LR 71 and Kaganas "Joint custody and equality in South Africa" 179, 
who explains it in the following terms – "since s 30(3) (of the interim Constitution) stipulates that 
the child's best interests are paramount, in all matters concerning such child, the equality rights 
of the parents would doubtless have to yield to the welfare principle". 
200  According to Schwenzer 2007 EJCL, trends with regard to parentage are becoming less and less 
orientated towards status: "The trend is to give priority to the autonomous private regulation 
within the private sphere, on the one hand, and, where an amicable settlement is not possible, to 
take the actual relationships and not the existing status as a reference point, on the other". 
201  Once both parents automatically acquire parental responsibilities and rights at the birth of the 
child, it should in one way or another be possible to enforce the duty to care for the child against 
both parents in accordance with the guarantee provided in S 28(1)(b) of the Constitution.  
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